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PRESUMPTIVE POSSESSION OF WEAPONS:
NEW YORK'S CONTROVERSIAL STATUTE
On March 28, 1973, the State Police stopped Melvin Lemmons
for speeding on the New York State Thruway. Jane Doe1 was seated
in the front alongside Lemmons, and Raymond Hardrick and Samuel
Allen were seated in the rear. Lemmons was arrested and placed in
the patrol car after a radio check mistakenly indicated that he was
wanted by the Detroit, Michigan Police Department. One of the po-
lice officers returned to the car to ascertain the identities of the three
remaining occupants. He looked through the window on the pas-
senger's side and spotted a handgun protruding from Jane Doe's
handbag, which was located on the floor of the car between -the right
door and the front seat. The officer then placed the three passengers
under arrest. A subsequent search revealed a second gun in the hand-
bag, and a machine gun and more than a pound of heroin in the
trunk. Lemmons, Hardrick, Allen, and Doe were acquitted of charges
stemming from the discovery of the machine gun and the heroin;2
however, they were each convicted on two counts of felonious pos-
session of a gun in violation of New York Penal Law section 265.05
(2). 3 Lemmons, Hardrick, and Allen were sentenced to seven years
imprisonment on each count, sentences to run concurrently.
At trial, the prosecution based its entire case on section 265.15(3)
of the New York Penal Law,4 which makes the presence of a weapon
1. Jane Doe was the fictitious name used by the court to describe a youthful of-
fender who was tried with the other defendants, convicted and sentenced to five years
probation. She did not participate in the appeal of this case.
2. At the trial the prosecution relied on the statutory presumptions contained in
,New York Penal Law § 265.15(1) and § 220.25(1) to establish the defendants'
constructive possession of the machine gun and the heroin, respectively. These
provisions make the presence of a controlled substance and a machine gun in a vehicle
presumptive evidence of their possession by all the occupants thereof. The prosecution
also offered the testimony of one witness who claimed she had seen the defendants place
something in the trunk of the borrowed vehicle they were using at the time of their
arrest. However, the defendants introduced two witnesses whose testimony was appar-
ently sufficient to impeach the testimony of the prosecution's witness and to convince
the jury not to invoke the inferences permitted by these presumptions.
3. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.05(2) (McKinney 1967) (current version at N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 265.02(4) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978)) in relevant part provided:
"Any person who has in his possession any firearm which is loaded with am-
munition, . . . is guilty of a class D felony."
4. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978) provides:
The presence in an automobile, other than a stolen one or a public omnibus,
of any firearm, defaced firearm, firearm silencer, explosive or incendiary bomb,
bombshell, gravity knife, switchblade knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, black-
jack, metal knuckles, chuka stick, sandbag, sandclub or slingshot is presump-
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
in an automobile presumptive evidence of its possession by all occu-
pants at the time the weapon is found. 5 No evidence, other than the
defendants' presence in the car, was introduced to establish their con-
trol over the guns. Section 265.15(3)(a) makes the presumption in-
applicable to weapons found "upon the person" of one of the auto-
mobile's occupants. Accordingly, defendants Lemmons, Hardrick, and
Allen argued that the presumption did not apply to them since the
guns found in the handbag were on the person of Jane Doe.0 The
defendants also argued that the presumption was unconstitutional as
applied. Both of these arguments were rejected by the trial court. De-
fendants Lemmons, Hardrick, and Allen appealed their convictions,
which were affirmed by the Appellate Division, Third Department,7
and by the New York Court of Appeals. 8 The defendants then filed
tive evidence of its possession by all persons occupying such automobile at the
time such weapon, instrument or appliance is found, except under the follow-
ing circumstances: (a) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found upon
the person of one of the occupants therein; (b) if such weapon, instrument
or appliance is found in an automobile which is being operated for hire by a
duly licensed driver in the due, lawful and proper pursuit of his trade, then
such presumption shall not apply to the driver; or (c) if the weapon so found
is a pistol or revolver and one of the occupants, not present under duress, has
in his possession a valid license to have and carry concealed the same.
5. MCCORMICK, MCCORMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 342, at
804 (2d ed. 1972), provides a brief explanation of the use of presumptions in criminal
cases:
A true shifting of the burden of producing evidence to the defendant in a
criminal case would mean that the court would be compelled to direct the jury
to find against him with regard to the presumed fact if he fails to introduce
sufficient proof on the issue. . . . [A] directed verdict or a peremptory ruling
against the accused in a criminal case, even as to a single element of the crime,
is abhorrent to the criminal law. Therefore, modem draftsmen, while retain-
ing the term presumption for criminal cases, have reduced the effect of pre-
sumptions in those cases to that of a standardized inference. The jury is per-
mitted but not required to accept the existence of the presumed fact even in
the absence of contrary evidence.
But see note 41 infra regarding modem criminal law theorists' skepticism of such "per-
missible inferences."
6. In support of this contention, the defendants cited the following cases: People
v. Moore, 32 N.Y.2d 67, 295 N.E.2d 780, 343 N.Y.S.2d 107, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1011 (1973) (search of defendant's handbag permissible as part of a frisk of her per-
son); People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 197, 255 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1964), cort.
denied, 380 U.S. 936 (1965) (upheld a frisk of defendant's briefcase finding that a
firearm concealed in the briefcase carried by the defendant was in effect concealed on
the defendant's person); People v. Bowles, 29 A.D.2d 996, 289 N.Y.S.2d 526 (3d Dep't
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969) (search of defendant's trousers, which were
on the floor of defendant's room, justified and reasonable as part of the frisk of the de-
fendant).
7. People v. Lemmons, 49 A.D.2d 639, 370 N.Y.S.2d 243 (3d Dep't 1975), aff'd,
40 N.Y.2d 505, 354 N.E.2d 836, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1976).
8. People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 354 N.E.2d 836, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1976).
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petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the District Court for the South-
ern District of New York, asserting that New York's statutory pre-
sumption was unconstitutional as applied and on its face. The dis-
trict court ruled that the statutory presumption was unconstitutional
as applied and granted the writs.9 The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, Judge Mansfield writing for the majority, affirmed the issuance
of the writs and held: It cannot be said with substantial assurance
that an inference of possession of a gun by a car's occupants is more
likely than not to flow from the gun's presence in the vehicle, there-
fore New York Penal Law section 265.15(3) is unconstitutional on
its face. Allen v. County Court, Ulster County, 568 F.2d 998 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3188 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1978) (No. 77-
1554).
I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS: THE SECOND
CiRcurr REvIEws SECTION 265.15(3)
Judge Mansfield outlined the development of United States Su-
preme Court cases that have imposed increasingly stringent standards
to be applied in testing a statutory presumption's conformance with
the requirements of due process. 10 He noted that when the substan-
tial equivalent of section 265.15(3) was first enacted by the legislature
in 1936,11 the most current statement of law regarding statutory pre-
sumptions was Morrison v. California.'2 In that case, Justice Cardozo
formulated the "comparative convenience" test: A presumption can
only be constitutional when there is a "manifest disparity in con-
venience of proof and opportunity for knowledge."' 3 Nine years later,
9. Allen v. County Court, Ulster County, No. 76 Civ. 4794 (S.D.N.Y. April 19,
1977).
10. MCCoRMIC, supra note 5, § 344 at 811, provides the following explana-
tion for the development of these due process requirements:
In criminal cases, even though its effect may be no more than that of a
permissible inference, a presumption may be sufficient to take an otherwise de-
fective prosecution case to the jury and ultimately result in a conviction that
otherwise could not have occurred. Furthermore, the existence of the presump-
tion as to a particular element of the crime may force the defendant to intro-
duce proof in rebuttal, including his own testimony, and thus force him to
waive his constitutional right to remain silent. A recognition of the impact of
these procedural consequences has caused the courts to review the creation and
use of presumptions in the light of the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
11. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1898-a (1936) (current version at N.Y. PENAL, LAW
§ 265.15(3) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978)).
12. 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
13. Id. at 90-91.
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in Tot v. United States,14 the Supreme Court rejected Justice Car-
dozo's test. The Court reasoned that the creation of a presumption
cannot be justified merely because a defendant has greater access to
information regarding a presumed fact than does a prosecutor. In al-
most all criminal cases, the Court explained, the defendants are more
familiar with the facts than the prosecution. Thus, if the comparative
convenience test were sufficient to justify a statutory presumption,
"the legislature might validly command that the finding of an indict-
ment, or mere proof of the identity of the accused, should create a
presumption of the existence of all the facts essential to guilt."'' The
Court in Tot ruled, therefore, that to uphold the validity of a statu-
tory presumption, there must be a "rational connection" between the
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed.
Judge Mansfield next cited United States v. Gainey'6 and United
States v. Romano 7 as examples of cases properly applying the "ra-
tional connection" test established in Tot. In Gainey, the Court was
asked to invalidate a statute providing that presence near an illicit
still was sufficient to establish the offense of carrying on an illegal dis-
tilling business. This offense encompasses any act connected with the
operation of a still. Noting that "strangers to the illegal business rarely
penetrate the curtain of secrecy,"18 the Supreme Court found the req-
uisite rational connection between the proved fact-presence near a
still, and the ultimate fact presumed-the broad offense of participa-
tion in an illegal distilling business. In Romano, however, the Su-
preme Court held a similar though more specific statutory presump-
tion unconstitutional. At issue in Romano was the statutory presump-
tion that presence near an illicit still was sufficient evidence to estab-
lish the offense of possession, custody, or control of the still. The Court
stated that a defendant's presence at a still indicates the likelihood
that he participated in the illegal scheme, and that such evidence
would therefore be relevant and admissible in a trial on a possession
charge. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the connection alone
was "too tenuous to permit a reasonable inference of guilt . . .,.
Drawing an analogy to Romano, Judge Mansfield reasoned that in a
similar way, presence in an automobile containing a firearm would be
14. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
15. Id. at 469.
16. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
17. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
18. 380 U.S. at 67-68.
19. 382 U.S. at 141.
[Vol. 27
POSSESSION OF WEAPONS
relevant and admissible in a trial on a possession charge, but would
be insufficient in itself to permit a reasonable inference of guilt.
Judge Mansfield next considered Leary v. United States,20 in
which the Court added more bite to the "rational connection" test.
A "criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or
'arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said
with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than
not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend."'21
Judge Mansfield noted that Leary raised the possibility that a pre-
sumption might be required to satisfy the criminal reasonable doubt
standard if proof of the crime charged or an essential element thereof
depended on the use of the presumption..2 2 This issue was not consid-
ered in Allen, however, because the presumption in question did not
even satisfy the "more likely than not" test set out in Leary.
Applying the Tot-Leary standards to the instant case,23 Judge
Mansfield concluded that "this statutory presumption must be de-
clared unconstitutional on its face unless it can be said with siibstan-
tial assurance that an inference of possession ... of a gun by a car's
occupants is more likely than not to flow from the gun's presence in
the vehicle. ' 24 He acknowledged that section 265.15(3) of the Penal
Law makes the presumption inapplicable in situations that would
otherwise result in especially irrational connections between the
proved and presumed facts. 25 Nonetheless, Judge Mansfield found no
rational basis for the presumption at issue, and noted that in many
situations occupants of a car would not even know there was a gun in
the vehicle, or, if they did know, they might not have had access to
it. The court considered factors such as the ease with which a gun can
be concealed in a car and the frequency of situations in which occu-
pants of a car are not well acquainted with one another.
20. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
21. Id. at 36.
22. 568 F.2d at 1006 n.14 (citing 395 U.S. at 36 n.64); see text accompanying
notes 40-42 infra.
23. The defendants' convictions were based on a statute which provides that the
presence of a gun in a car (the proved fact) is sufficient evidence to permit the jury
to infer the possession of such gun by all persons in the car (the presumed fact). Un-
der the New York Penal Law, to "possess" is "to have physical possession or other-
wise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property." N.Y. PENAL LAw § 10.00
(8) (McKinney 1975).
24. 568 F.2d at 1007.
25. See note 3 supra for the exception to § 265.15 (3).
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II. THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEA.s RE iEWS
SECTION 265.15(3)
At trial, and on appeal to the state courts, the defendants argued
that the presumption was unconstitutional as applied. The New York
Court of Appeals, however, made no mention in its opinion of any
conclusion regarding the strength of the connection between the
proved and presumed facts. An examination of that court's opinion
reveals its failure to consider the due process requirements established
in Tot and Leary.
Judge Jasen initiated the majority opinion by noting that prior
to the enactment of the presumption in question it was generally im-
possible to establish possession in a situation like Allen. Courts had
thus been forced to release all of the defendants. 28 In response to what
a New York Supreme Court Justice had considered an "urgent need"2
for remedial action, the legislature, according to Judge Jasen, "took
heed" of this plea and enacted the statutory presumption. 2 A major
portion of Judge Jasen's opinion is devoted to an explication of this
perceived need.
Judge Jasen disposed of the defendants' contention that the statu-
tory presumption was inapplicable to them because the guns were
found "upon the person" of Jane Doe (in her handbag): If the fact
that the weapons were found in a personalized container could pre-
clude the use of the presumption, "[a]stute illegal possessors of weap-
ons" could use such containers to evade joint responsibility." He ex-
pressed concern that such reasoning might be applied to "briefcases,
shopping bags with groceries, cartons, suitcases, or the myriad of other
things that people frequently carry or transport."30 The resultant po-
tential for escaping responsibility would defeat legislative intent and
"return the law to the early days of this century when law enforce-
ment was easily frustrated .. ". ."81 Furthermore, said Judge Jasen,
absent "clear indication" that the weapon was on the person of one
26. See People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 354 N.E.2d 836, 839, 387
N.Y.S.2d 97, 100 (1976) (citing People ex rel. DeFeo v. Warden, 136 Misc. 836, 241
N.Y.S. 63 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1930)).
27. 136 Misc. 836, 241 N.Y.S. 63 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1930).
28. People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 354 N.E.2d 836, 839, 387 N.Y.S.
2d 97, 100 (1976).
29. Id. at 511, 354 N.E.2d at 840, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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occupant, the question of the presumption's applicability should be
left to a jury.32
In reaching its conclusion, the New York Court of Appeals relied
heavily on an analysis similar to comparative convenience. This type
of analysis focuses on the practical necessity for the presumption in
situations in which a particular element of the crime is especially dif-
ficult for the prosecution to establish. A court using the test compares
the information available to the prosecution against that information
normally available to the defendant. If it finds that in regard to a par-
ticular element of the crime it would be significantly more convenient
for the defendant to explain his innocence than for the prosecution
to establish his guilt, the presumption stands and the burden of going
forward with evidence shifts to the defendant. As indicated earlier,
the United States Supreme Court rejected the comparative con-
venience test more than thirty-five years ago because the test did not
meet the due process requirements embodied in the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. As Tot explained, if comparative convenience
were the sole test for determining a presumption's constitutionality,
the legislature could effectively restructure the criminal justice sys-
tem by placing the defendant in the position of having to establish
his innocence. The comparative convenience test was, therefore, re-
duced to a mere corollary of the rational connection test, admissible
for consideration only after the presumption has satisfied the require-
ments of due process. Nonetheless, Judge Jasen emphasized the prac-
tical considerations giving rise to the enactment of the presumption
without first examining the presumption to determine whether the
proved and presumed facts were even rationally related.
The same mistaken analysis was applied by the New York Court
of Appeals to the "upon the person" exception. Judge Jasen expressed
his fear that if this case were to be found within the exception, de-
fendants in many similar situations would also escape the reach of
the presumption. By stating that such a result would return the law
to the days when enforcement was easily frustrated, the court indi-
cated that its primary concern was to avoid returning to the prosecu-
tion the heavy burden of establishing possession. The court never
questioned whether a weapon concealed in a woman's handbag is
more likely than not possessed by all the occupants of the car in which
it is found. In contrast, the court's most conclusive statement on this
32. Id. at 511-12, 354 N.E.2d at 840-41, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
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issue was that "the placement of a weapon in a handbag does not nec-
essarily indicate that the owner of a handbag is in the sole and exclu-
sive possession of the weapon."' '
Judge Wachtler, dissenting in part, acknowledged the due process
requirements established in Tot and Leary. Yet, he found it rational
to infer from a person's presence in an automobile that he had actual
or constructive possession of a weapon found in that vehicle. In de-
termining the presumption's applicability in this case, however, Judge
Wachtler agreed with the defendants that the "upon the person" ex-
ception controlled. He stated that where weapons are in a woman's
handbag, located within her reach, the "inference that all the occu-
pants possessed these weapons hardly follows, naturally and rationally,
from these circumstances." Furthermore, "this conclusion is ines-
capable in the light of the historical origin of this statute as formu-
lated within due process requirements."3 5 Judge Wachtler thus recog-
nized that the legislature, in devising exceptions to the presumption,
had excluded those situations in which its application would have
most blatantly violated the demands of due process. These exceptions
are clearly outside the boundaries of the due process requirements,
and therefore the closer a given fact situation is to one of these ex-
ceptions, the more likely it is to violate due process. Accordingly, the
question of whether the defendants fell within one of the statutorily
provided exceptions, like any question pertaining to the presumption's
applicability, must be reviewed in the light of the requirements of
due process.
In contrast to Judge Wachtler's dissent, the majority concluded
that unless the defendants were clearly within the statutory exception,
the question of the presumption's applicability should be left for the
jury to decide. It is the responsibility of the court, however, to insure
that the application of the statutory presumption comports with the
requirements of due process before it is submitted to the jury. Tot,
Leary, and countless other cases affirming the principles that they em-
body,30 have transformed the question of whether the presumed fact
is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact, into more than
a mere factual question. The question is rather one of law as well,
33. Id. at 511, 354 N.E.2d at 840, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 101 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 515, 354 N.E.2d at 843, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (Wachtler J., dissenting
in part).
35. Id., 354 N.E.2d at 843, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 104 (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., note 38 infra.
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which must be resolved by the court before the presumption can be
submitted to the jury for consideration.
Judge Jasen's disregard of the constitutional tests established in
Tot and Leary necessitated the Second Circuit's review of the entire
development of due process standards. Judge Mansfield stated that:
"Nothing in the Lemmons decision or others upholding the presump-
tion demonstrates that the state courts or legislature have ever at-
tempted to justify this firearm presumption as Leary requires."' 7 In
light of the fact that these due process requirements are not novel to
the New York courts.-s Judge Jasen's opinion becomes even more
37. 568 F.2d at 1008. It should be noted in response to Judge Mansfield's justi-
fiable criticism of the New York courts and legislature, that in the pas% several lower
courts have taken it upon themselves to insure the requirements of due process were
not violated. In People ex reL. Dixon v. Lewis, 249 A.D. 464, 293 N.Y.S. 191 (3d Dep't
1937) aff'd per curiam, 276 N.Y. 613, 12 N.E.2d 603 (1938), appellants Dixon and
Latham appealed from orders dismissing writs of habeas corpus, challenging the consti-
tutionality of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1898-a (the substantial equivalent of N.Y. PFNAL LAW
§ 265.15(3)). The court reversed the orders and sustained the writs of habeas corpus.
Although the majority did not specifically declare the statute unconstitutional, Justice
Rhodes, concurring, made clear his opinion that the statutory presumptions did not
comport with the due process of law:
Mhe Legislature has not the power to declare that certain facts shall be suffi-
cient to prove the thing sought to be established, when it is apparent that such
facts do not in reason and logic possess such inherent probative force and value;
otherwise the Legislature might by fiat create a presumption which would per-
mit the guilt of the defendant to be declared without actual proof thereof.
There must be a rational connection between the facts proven and the ulti-
mate fact sought to be established.
249 A.D. at 468-69, 293 N.Y.S. at 193. When the court of appeals affirmed the order
sustaining the writs, it did not, however, pass on the constitutionality of the presump-
tion. The court said that the question could not be reached, since the information failed
to state a crime. People ex rel Dixon v. Lewis, 276 N.Y. 613, 12 N.E.2d 603 (1938).
Similarly, the New York supreme court in People ex rel. Schubert v. Pinder, 170
Misc. 345, 9 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1938), and in People ex reL. Fry
v. Hunt, 29 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct., Wyoming Co. 1941), motion granted, 289 N.Y.
653, 44 N.E.2d 625 (1942), sustained writs of habeas corpus discharging prisoners from
custody, on the grounds that the statutory presumptions (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1898-a) on
which their convictions were based did not comply with the requirements of due process.
38. As early as 1893, Justice Peckham of the New York Court of Appeals, in a
comment regarding the use of presumptions in criminal prosecutions, stated:
[Tihe fact upon which the presumption is to rest must have some fair rela-
tion to, or natural connection with the main fact. The inference of the exist-
ence of the main fact because of the existence of the fact actually proved,
must not be merely and purely arbitrary, or wholly unreasonable, unnatural,
or extraordinary ....
People v. Cannon, 139 N.Y. 32, 43, 34 N.E. 759, 762 (1893).
In People v. McCaleb, 25 N.Y.2d 394, 255 N.E.2d 136, 306 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1969),
the New York Court of Appeals upheld a statute providing that occupation of an auto-
mobile without the owner's consent is sufficient evidence to infer that the occupant has
knowledge of the lack of consent. Noting the nature of "joy riding," the court accepted
the state's argument that it is more likely than not that one youth, in the company of
another with an automobile, would know whether his companion has consent to use
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curious. The circumstances of this case may explain the court's pre-
occupation with the practical benefits of the presumption, as well as
the court's failure to apply the appropriate standard of review. The
defendants were occupants of a car containing two handguns, one ma-
chine gun, and over a pound of heroin.39 Despite obvious implications
of the guilt of at least one occupant, it is doubtful that any would
have been convicted of possession of the handguns in the absence of
the statutory presumption. At trial, the presumption served as a price-
less tool, enabling the prosecutor to obtain convictions by merely es-
tablishing each defendant's presence in the automobile at the time
the firearms were found. The value of this statutory presumption
should not be underestimated in the light of the exceptionally diffi-
cult task faced by prosecutors attempting to prove possession in these
situations. Nonetheless, the practical necessity for such a presumption
cannot justify its use when the fact presumed bears only the most
tenuous relationship to the fact actually established. The goal of the
judicial system is not simply to convict; it is equally, if not more im-
portant, to acquit the innocent. The due process tests of Tot and
Leary safeguard the innocent and insure that laws meant to convict
the guilty do not, through broad language, trap the innocent.
In addition, the standards of review established by the Supreme
Court in Tot and Leary offer the criminal defendant only the bare
minimum protection of his due process rights. Modem criminal law
theorists currently argue for more stringent standards for the review
of criminal presumptions.40 They contend that the defendant's right
that vehicle. The court weighed the presumption against the tests embodied in Tot and
Leary and concluded that the statute satisfied due process.
In People v. Levya, 38 N.Y.2d 160, 341 N.E.2d 546, 379 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1975),
the New York Court of Appeals also acknowledged the due process requirements of
Tot and Leary. The court relied on the 1972 INTERIM REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY
STATE COMMISSION TO EVALUATE THE DRUG LAWS, which stated that it would be
unlikely that persons transporting large quantities of dangerous drugs would go driv-
ing with innocent friends or pick up strangers. Accordingly, it upheld the constitution-
ality of a statute making the presence of a dangerous drug in an automobile presump-
tive evidence of knowing possession by each person in the auto at the time the drugs
are found.
39. See note 2 supra regarding defendants' acquittal of charges for possession of
the machine gun and heroin.
40. See, e.g., Ashford & Ris'mger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in
Criminal Cases; A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969); Holland & Cham-
berlin, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 7 VAL.
L. REV. 147 (1973); Comment, Criminal Statutory Presumptions and the Reasonable
Doubt Standard of Proof: Is Due Process Overdue?, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 223 (1974);
Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Reconciling the Practical With the
Sacrosanct, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 157 (1970).
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to have every element of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt
is not sufficiently protected by the "more likely than not" test enunci-
ated in Leary.41 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the pos-
sibility that greater protection of the defendant's due process rights
may be required. 42
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NEW YORK PENAL LAW SECTION
265.15(3) "As APPLIED" vs. "ON ITS FACE"
An important element of the Second Circuit's opinion was its de-
cision to hold the presumption unconstitutional on its face rather than
as applied, despite the state's contention that the "on its face" issue
was not properly before the circuit court. At trial and on appeal be-
fore the state courts, the defendants had only argued that the pre-
sumption was unconstitutional as applied. Thus, since the defendants
argued in the federal courts that the presumption was unconstitu-
tional on its face, they were asking the court to consider a different
claim-one that had to be addressed by the state courts before a fed-
eral court could consider the habeas corpus petition.43
Judge Mansfield rejected the state's argument because the ulti-
mate question for disposition-whether there exists a sufficient con-
41. Ashford & Risinger, supra note 40, offer the following analysis: When a
criminal presumption is applied, the court charges the jury that while the presumed
fact must on all evidence be found beyond a reasonable doubt, the law declares that
the jury may regard the facts giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence of
the presumed fact. The justification for concluding that the presumption does not deny
the defendant his right to have a jury find every element of the crime beyond a rea-
sonable doubt is based on the premise that the jury is permitted but not required to
find the existence of the proved fact as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact. It is
a difficult task, however, for the jury to determine whether a particular element of
a crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. When faced with this task, the
jury will rely heavily on the judge's instructions that in the eyes of the law the facts
proved constitute sufficient evidence to justify a finding of the fact presumed beyond
a reasonable doubt. The jury, having found the proved fact, and having been informed
that a finding of the presumed fact is correct in the eyes of the law, will look to see
if there is evidence tending to disprove the presumed fact. If no evidence rebutting
the presumed fact has been introduced, the jury will most likely find the existence of
the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. In such instances, the defendant will be
deprived of his right to a fair and independent jury determination. Defendants subject
to the presumption in question would often be faced with the impossible burden of
rebutting an inference of possession by being forced to explain the presence of weapons
they knew nothing about. In such situations, a finding by the jury of the presumed
fact, possession of the weapon, seems an almost unavoidable result.
42. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 842-46 (1973); Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. at 36 n.64.
43. Applicants for federal habeas corpus relief must first exhaust available state
remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c); see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434-35 (1963).
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nection between the proved and presumed facts-was substantially the
same regardless of the context in which the law was considered.44 He
also noted that since the New York Court of Appeals had failed to
declare the presumption unconstitutional as applied in a situation
such as Allen, it is inconceivable that the court would hold the pre-
sumption unconstitutional on its face. In support of its apparent
bypass of state exhaustion requirements, the court cited Stubbs v.
Smith.45 In that case, the Second Circuit refused to require the habeas
petitioner to exhaust his state court remedies on the issue of the con-
stitutionality of this same presumption, despite the fact that the ques-
tion had not been raised in either the state or district court.40 The
court in Stubbs reasoned that the highest state court had already re-
jected the substance of petitioner's legal claim and that there was no
indication that the New York Court of Appeals would depart from
its prior decisions. 47
Judge Mansfield, explaining the reason for the court's broad hold-
ing, said that when the requisite connection between proved and pre-
44. The circuit court found support for its assertion in Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.
270 (1971). In Picard, the Supreme Court acknowledged instances in which the ulti-
mate question for disposition would remain the same despite variations in the legal
theory. Specifically, the Court reasoned that it is the substance of federal habeas corpus
claims which must first be presented to the state courts in order to exhaust state rem-
edies.
45. 533 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1976). For other cases sanctioning a futility of exhaus-
tion argument see, e.g., Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1082 (1st Cir. 1973);
Ham v. North Carolina, 471 F.2d 406, 407-08 (4th Cir. 1973); Perry v. Blackledge,
453 F.2d 856, 857 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
46. The court in Stubbs never reached the question of whether the presumption
satisfied the "more likely than not" standard of Leary. The court held that even if the
use of the presumption was unconstitutional error, that error was rendered harmless by
the fact that there was enough circumstantial evidence to establish the appellant's pos-
session of the weapon beyond a reasonable doubt. 533 F.2d at 70-71.
47. A futility of exhaustion argument is even more convincing in the case at hand
than it was in Stubbs. In Allen, the circuit court was able to rely on the state court's
decision in Lemmons as additional support for a futility of exhaustion argument, since
the New York Court of Appeals was even unwilling to find the presumption uncon-
stitutional as applied. The value of Lemmons becomes more apparent when compared
with the cases cited to support a futility of exhaustion argument in Stubbs. Stubbs cited
People v. Russo, 303 N.Y. 673, 102 N.E.2d 834 (1951), and People v. Levya, 38 N.Y.
2d 160, 341 N.E.2d 546, 379 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1975). As conceded by the court in Stubbs,
533 F.2d at 69, Russo had been decided prior to Leary, and the decision upholding
this same statutory presumption had been reached on the basis of the Tot rational con-
nection test, not on the more stringent standards later established in Leary. In Levya,
the court reviewed the constitutionality of a different presumption permitting the in-
ference of possession of a controlled substance by all persons inside an automobile in
which the drug was found. The circuit court in Allen distinguished Levya, noting that
'in upholding the statutory presumption "the Levya court had before it a report indi-
cating that the New York legislature may have actually found the connection required
by Leary." 568 F.2d at 1008-09 n.18.
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sumed facts depends only on one or two clearly identifiable factual
considerations not specifically mentioned in the statute, the court has
not hesitated to restrict itself to an "as applied" holding.48 He rea-
soned, however, that it is much different when the relationship be-
tween proved and presumed facts depends on a large variety of cir-
cumstances. In this latter case, the court would be forced to examine
carefully the nature and quality of the evidence to determine if the
presumption could be constitutionally applied. 49 And, such an ap-
proach would resemble "more a holding as to the sufficiency of the
evidence than the 'more likely than not' determination required by
Leary."50 Other Second Circuit opinions were cited in support of the
proposition that sufficiency of evidence is a question of state law that
federal courts have traditionally refused to consider in habeas peti-
tions.5' The court concluded that by limiting itself to an as applied
holding, the end result would be "wholesale conversion of state law
issues into due process questions." 52 "[E]very prisoner to whom this
presumption had been applied could effectively challenge the suffi-
48. The circuit court cited Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970) and
United States v. Gonzalez, 442 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied sub
nor. Ovalle v. United States, 404 U.S. 845 (1971), in support of this proposition.
In Turner, the Supreme Court reviewed a statutory presumption which provided that
when a person is shown to have possession of a narcotic drug (the proved fact) it is
permissible to infer that the drug was illegally imported and that the possessor knew
of its illegal importation. The Supreme Court noted that thefts of cocaine from legal
sources inside the United States are sufficiently large as to render the presumption in-
valid as applied to Turner, who possessed what the Court considered to be a small
quantity of the substance. However, the Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility
that the presumption might be valid with regard to larger amounts of cocaine which
would be less likely to come from United States sources. In Gonzalez, the Court held
that the same statutory presumption was valid when applied to possession of larger
amounts of cocaine.
49. The state in its brief before the United States Court of Appeals criticized the
district court for doing precisely what Judge Mansfield sought to avoid. The Attorney
General argued:
By concluding that the facts of this case did not support the presumption of
possession, the District Court implicitly ruled upon the sufficiency of the evi-
dence before the jury. It is almost axiomatic that a federal habeas corpus court
may not sit as an appellate court to review the sufficiency of the evidence in
support of a conviction unless the conviction is so totally devoid of evidentiary
support as to be a violation of due process.
Brief for Appellant at 14, Allen v. County Court, Ulster County, 568 F.2d 998 (2d
Cir. 1977).
50. 568 F.2d at 1010.
51. Id., citing Terry v. Henderson, 462 F.2d 1125, 1131 (2d Cir. 1972);
United States ex rel. Griffin v. Martin, 409 F.2d 1300, 1302 (2d Cir. 1969); United
States ex rel. Mintzer v. Dros, 403 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1044 (1968).
52. 568 F.2d at 1010 n.21.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ciency of the evidence in his case by claiming that the evidence was
insufficient to support the use of the presumption against him."63
Judge Timbers of the Second Circuit, concurring, argued that the
statutory presumption should be held unconstitutional as applied. He
acknowledged that the reason the Second Circuit has avoided consid-
ering sufficiency of evidence claims "stems from a desire to avoid in-
trusions into matters properly the province of the state courts," but
argued that moreover, this policy "has the virtue of prudently avoid-
ing unnecessary constitutional showdowns. '5 4 Judge Timbers ques-
tioned the logic of avoiding sufficiency of evidence claims in order to
guard against unnecessary federal-state conflict when such a policy re-
quires the federal courts to declare the New York statutory presump-
tion unconstitutional on its face, an act which he considered "the
most extreme form of exacerbation of federal-state relations."' 5
Judge Mansfield offered another argument in favor of holding
the statutory presumption unconstitutional on its face rather than as
applied. He stated that in order for the presumption to be constitu-
tional as applied, the requisite relation between a defendant's presence
in a car containing a weapon and his possession of that weapon would
have to be established by independent evidence. Noting the "fruitless-
ness" of such an approach, Judge Mansfield explained that "[i]n effect
the validity of the presumption would be upheld only in instances
where the evidence would, independent of the statute, support an in-
ference of possession." 56 In practice, Judge Mansfield's prediction is
53. Id.
54. 568 F.2d at 1011 (Timbers, J., concurring).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1010. The courts of both Illinois and New Jersey have upheld the con-
stitutionality of statutory presumptions practically identical to the statutory presump-
tion in question, on an "as applied" basis. An examinaion of these decisions reveals
that the independent evidence presented in support of the constitutionality of these
presumptions would probably have been sufficient in itself to support an inference of
possession. In People v. Hood, 49 Ill. 2d 526, 276 N.E.2d 310 (1971), the Supreme
Court of Illinois held the statutory presumption constitutional as applied in the light
of the court's finding that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle and in control
of the vehicle, and that the shotgun was located under the seat of the defendant. In
State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 257 A.2d 699 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 (1970),
the Supreme Court of New Jersey relied on independent evidence connecting appellant
Hock with the possession of a revolver, and thereby upheld the constitutionality of the
statutory presumption as applied. Hock occupied the right front seat of an automobile.
Police had ordered the driver of the automobile to drive to police headquarters. On
the way, the officer following saw Hock bend forward toward the floor for an appreci-
able amount of time. The gun was found under Hock's seat upon arrival at the sta-
tion. In State v. Blanca, 100 N.J. Super. 241, 241 A.2d 647 (Super. Ct., App. Div.
1968), the court upheld the use of the statutory presumption stating that "the valid-
ity and applicability of N.J.S. 2A: 151-7, N.J.S.A., must be judged in the light of the
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not without -merit. In almost any case in which sufficient circumstan-
tial evidence has been presented to render application of the presump-
tion constitutionally sound, the jury would probably rely on that in-
dependent evidence, rather than the presumption, in deciding whether
to infer possession beyond a reasonable doubt. At least in theory, how-
ever, there would exist some situations in which the circumstantial
evidence would be sufficient to satisfy the "more likely than not"
standard of Leary, and yet be insufficient to support an inference of
possession. independent of the presumption. In those situations, a per-
fectly functioning jury could not find the element of possession be-
yond a reasonable doubt without the aid of the presumption.
IV. HAVE WE SEEN THE LAST OF NEW YORK
PENAL LAW SECTION 265.15(3)?
On January 17, 1978, Justice Rubin of the Supreme Court of
Queens County rendered a decision in the case of People v. Williams.57
Defendant Williams had been found guilty of the felony of criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree. The jury had been in-
structed regarding the presumption of possession under section
265.15(3) of the New'York Penal Law. Relying on Allen, Williams
moved to have the guilty verdict set aside. Justice Rubin denied the
defendant's motion, finding the presumption constitutional as applied
to the facts in the case. 58
totality of circumstances in a particular case." 100 N.J. Super. at 249, 241 A.2d at
651. The "circumstances" supporting the use of the presumption in this case could
certainly have supported an inference of possession independent of the presumption.
In this case, appellants used pistols in the perpetration of a robbery. Within an hour
after the robbery, the police found both pistols on the floor of the car, one alongside
each appellant. Later witnesses even identified the pistol found alongside each appel-
lant, as the same one used by that appellant in the robbery.
57. 93 Misc. 2d 93, 402 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1978).
58. Since Williams, the New York Supreme Court in People v. Joseph, 93 Misc.
2d 267, 402 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1978), and in People v. Handre, 94
Misc. 2d 217, 404 N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1978) also considered
the constitutionality of the statutory presumption in question. In Joseph, Justice Milonas
dismissed an indictment which rested almost entirely on the presumption. He noted
the fact that the New York Court of Appeals has "declined to confront directly the
constitutionality of the statutory presumption," 93 Misc. 2d at 271, 402 N.Y.S.2d at
754, and referred to the opinion of the Second Circuit as "extremely persuasive." Id.
at 270, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 753. Justice Milonas acknowledged the fact that the Second
Circuit's decision is not binding upon the state courts. Yet, he argued that this does
-not mean the New York courts are obligated to ignore that holding. In conclusion,
Justice Milonas stated that in regard to federal matters the federal courts speak with
supremacy.
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In disregarding the Second Circuit's decision in Allen, Justice
Rubin stated:
When a conflict regarding the constitutionality of a state statute
exists as between a state court and a federal court, other than the
Supreme Court of the United States, the state court is not bound by
the federal court's reading of the statute. More specifically, in the
event of contrary views between the New York Court of Appeals and
a United States Circuit Court of Appeals, the rulings of the New
York Court of Appeals are controlling upon all state courts. 9
There is substantial support for the contention that the New York
Supreme Court was not bound by the Second Circuit's decision in
Allen.60 An examination of the cases relied on in Williams, however,
raises the question of whether the decision of the New York Court of
Appeals was actually controlling upon the New York Supreme Court
as Justice Rubin contends."' In any event, Justice Rubin did not
merely follow the ruling of the New York Court of Appeals with blind
allegiance.
The factual situation involved in Williams made any decision
exceptionally difficult. Williams was the sole occupant of a vehicle
In Handre, Justice Deeley denied a defendant's motion in which the defendant
argued that the Second Circuit's opinion in Allen constituted a legal impediment to
continuing prosecution under the presumption. The court offered no independent evalu-
ation in its opinion regarding the statutory presumption's compliance with due process.
Apparently feeling constrained to follow the decision of the New York Court of Ap-
peals, Justice Deeley stated that "[a]lthough it is heady wine indeed for a trial court
to have the opportunity to render unconstitutional the acts of the legislative body, this
is a sober, serious decision rarely to be made." 94 Misc. 2d at 220, 404 N.Y.S.2d at
275.
59. 93 Misc. 2d at 94, 402 N.Y.S. 2d at 290 (citing People v. Malloy, 21 A.D.2d
904, 251 N.Y.S.2d 752 (2d Dep't 1964), revzd on other grounds, 22 N.Y.2d 559, 293
N.Y.S.2d 542 (1965)); Walker v. Walker, 51 A.D.2d 1029, 1030, 381 N.Y.S.2d 310,
311-12 (2d Dep't 1976).
60. This proposition is usually based on the fact that the lower federal courts do
not exercise jurisdiction over state courts. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lawrence v.
Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971). See
generally Annot., 147 A.L.R. 857 (1943).
61. See note 59 supra. In People v. Malloy, 21 A.D.2d 904, 251 N.Y.S.2d 752
(2d Dep't 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 22 N.Y.2d 559, 240 N.E.2d 37, 293 N.Y.S.2d
542 (1965), the appellate division did specifically state that when such a conflict arises,
"the rulings of the New York Court of Appeals are controlling on the court."
However, the court cited Aronson v. McNeil, 19 A.D.2d 731, 732, 244 N.Y.S.2d
427 (2d Dep't 1963), as its sole support for this proposition. Moreover, while the
appellate division in Aronson did express its belief that it was constrained to follow
the ruling of the New York Court of Appeals, the court offered no precedent in
support of its conclusion. In Walker v. Walker, the other case cited by Justice Rubin
in support of this proposition, the court never addressed the question of whether it
must follow the ruling of the New York Court of Appeals in such a situation, 51
A.D.2d 1029 (2d Dep't 1976). To the contrary, the court noted that the issue was
whether the court was bound to follow the federal court's holding or, if not so bound,
should apply its own reasoning in resolving this case. Id. at 1030.
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when a weapon was found* underneath the driver's seat. Justice Rubin
found that "[i]n such a case, a conclusion of possession, actual or con-
structive, is natural and consistent with life and life's experiences.10 2
This is one of -the very few factual situations in which a court might
legitimately find the presumption constitutional as applied without
the support of independent evidence sufficient to establish an inference
of possesssion on its own.63
Justice Rubin noted the substantial difference between the facts
in Williams and those in Allen, and stated that the facts "suggest that
if this case had been the subject of the Allen appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals might have reached a different result. ' 64 Although on
rare occasions such as this a particular factual situation might make
application of the statutory presumption particularly tempting, it is
extremely doubtful that the Second Circuit would have reached a
different result.6 5 Paramount in the minds of the judges of the circuit
court was -the protection of due process rights. A similar statutory pre-
sumption, limited to situations in which there is only one occupant in
a car in which a weapon is found, might comport with the require-
ments of due process; however, the presumption in question was clearly
intended to apply to situations in which there is more than one occu-
pant in a vehicle.66 It is under those circumstances that possession of
a weapon found in a vehicle is especially difficult to establish. And, it
is under those circumstances that the United States Court of Appeals
quite properly found the statutory presumption unconstitutional.
MuRRAY N. CAPLAN
62. 93 Misc. 2d at 96, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 291. The determination that a statutory
presumption is consistent with life and life's experiences is essentially the New York
version of the due process test embodied in Leary. See, e.g., People v. McCaleb, 25
N.Y.2d 394, 400-01, 255 N.E.2d 136, 306 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1969); People v. Terra, 303
N.Y. 332, 335, 102 N.E.2d 576, 578 (1951).
63. See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
64. 93 Misc. 2d at 95, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
65. This is, of course, assuming that the issue of the statute's constitutionality on
its face would be properly before the court.
66. See Defeo v. Warden, 136 Misc. 836, 241 N.Y.S. 63 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.
1930), in which the court stated:
The cases construing the word "possession" under section 1897 of the Penal
Law make conviction impossible unless there is shown which occupant of the
automobile possessed the pistol, and this notwithstanding the fact that its pres-
ence in an automobile makes it available for instant use by any of the occu-
pants .... This, and similar cases, establishes the urgent need for legislation
making the presence of a forbidden firearm in an automobile or other vehicle
presumptive evidence of its possession by all the occupants thereof.
See also People v. Anthony, 21 A.D.2d 666, 249 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1st Dep't 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 983 (1965).

